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Volume I APRIL, 1936 Number 2
Interests in Chattels Real and
Personal
PERCY BORDWELL**
While the trust and the will have played no small part in the modern law
as to future interests in land,' in the corresponding law as to chattels they
have, as it were, stolen the show. The immutability and indestructibility of
land made the law of estates workable without the interposition of any third
party to safeguard the property for those interested. The personal chattel
had, and has, no such immutability or indestructibility, and the interposition
of some third party such as the trustee, in the case of the trust, or the executor
or administrator with the will annexed, in the case of the will, is almost, if
not quite, essential to the security of the person entitled to the future interest.
This difference between land and the personal chattel is not something
temporary or artificial. The trustee or the executor or the administrator with
the will annexed is, therefore, likely to continue to play just as important a
part in future interests in chattels personal as he has in the past. Well-advised
settlors of such property will put it in trust and not hazard the application
to it of the common law of estates. Not all settlors, however, are well-advised,
and so the applicability of the common law of estates even to chattels personal
is not entirely academic.
The typical chattel real was, and is, the term for years. Such an interest
is an interest in land, a leasehold rather than a freehold, and were it not for the
accidents of legal history, would be classified primarily with other interests
in land rather than with chattels. The subject matter of leasehold and freehold
alike is the land and the land is no less immutable or indestructible in the
one case than in the other. There is no such compelling reason, therefore,
for the interposition of a third person for the protection of future interests
in chattels real as there is in the case of chattels personal. This has been
reflected in pronounced differences in the law of future interests applicable
*This is the fourth of a series of articles by the author. The first, The Common Law
Scheme of Estates, appeared in (1933) 18 IowA L. REV. 425; the second, Equity and the
Law of Property, appeared in (1934) 20 IowA L. REv. 1; the third, The Conversion of the
Use into a Legal Interest, in (1935) 21 IowA L. REV. 1. Subsequent articles will take up
Alienability and the Rule against Perpetuities, and Statutory Reform in the Nineteenth
Century.
**Professor of Law, Iowa Law School.
1. See articles cited supra note *.
(119)
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i MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
to the two types of chattels.2 But as a whole these differences have been less
conspicuous than the factual differences between the two types of chattels
would lead one to expect. The chattel character of the term for years has, at
times, proved weightier than its incidence in the land. It was this chattel
character that was held in England to keep it outside the scope of the Statute
of Uses' and that made its limitation by will independent of the Statute of
Wills. 4 This freedom of the term for years from the Statutes of Uses and Wills
freed the term for years from the prejudices aroused by those Statutes and
allowed a development of the trust and of executory interests in connection
therewith that profoundly affected the whole law.
The leading case' on future interests in chattels involved a chattel personal
and for more than three quarters of a century6 remained the only authority to
be reckoned with as to chattels generally. In the time of Henry VIII, however,
there came to be a great increase in long terms for years,7 and until the rise of
the modern moneyed securities it was the limitation of those long terms for
years rather than the settlement of personal chattels that occupied the at-
tention of the courts. This increase in long tdrms for years was due partly to
the increased protection given the termor for years by the St. 21 Hen. VIII,
c. 15 (1529) against collusive proceedings by the one having the fee, partly to
the suppression by the Statute of Uses of the devise of land by way of the use,'
partly to the desire to avoid the incidents of tenure in capitel and perhaps
most of all, to the fact that uses limited on legal terms for years were held not
to be within the Statute of Uses" and the consequent development of long
trust terms to satisfy the various exigencies of family settlements." With the
change in the form of moneyed securities from rents 2 to stocks and bonds 3
2. Particularly in the continued application of the theory of use and occupation to
chattels personal after the substitution of the theory of the executory devise in the case
of chattels real. The theory of use and occupation assumed the continuing function of the
executor. In the case of the executory devise, the assent of the executor was given once
and for all to the first devisee. As to these matters see infra Use and Occupation and The
Executory Devise.
3. 27 HENRY VIII, c. 10 (1535-1536).
4. 32 HENRY VIII, c. 1 (1540).
5. Y. B. 37 Hen. VI, 30 (1459); see infra Use and Occupation.
6. Until Dyer 7a, pl. 8 (1536).
7. 2 BL. COMM. * 142; 4 HOLDSWORTH, A HIsToRY or ENGLISH LAW (1924) 465, 7
id. (1926) at 130. Joshua Williams was struck with their vogue in Elizabeth's time; see his
THE SETTLEMENT OF REAL ESTATE (1879) 258.
8. 4 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 465 n. 2.
9. 5 id. (1927) at 306, 307; 7 id. (1926) at 130.
10. Anon., Dyer 369a, Jenk. 245 (1580).
11. For a consideration of these long trust terms, see WILLIAMS, REAL PROPERTY
(23rd ed. 1920) 584-594.
12. See Frank A. Fetter, Rent Charge, 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
(1934) 292.
13. In the last decade of the seventeenth century, dealings in company shares became
numerous enough to cause the publication of a paper listing the prices of stock and shares
(8 HOLDSWORTH, (1926) op. cit. supra note 7, at 214, and in 1704 two famous merchants in
London had told Holt, C. J., that "bonds for money were transferred frequently, and in-
dorsed as bills of exchange." Buller v. Crips. 6 Mod. 29, 30. See 8 HOLDSWORTH (1926)
op. cit. supra note 7 at 172 n. 2, 175.
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and the great industrial development of the nineteenth century, outstanding
securities classed as personal chattels came to form a predominant element
in the national wealth.' 4 This new form of wealth was fairly permanent in its
nature, primarily intended for investment, and suitable, therefore, for family
settlements. It was made to order for the trust device. As the trust had again
come into its own, there was, therefore, little occasion for any great develop-
ment as to what might be done with these .securities by way of future limita-
tion at common law. 15
Long terms for years have not been as common in the United States, with
the exception of Maryland, as in England, and so the law as to their future
limitation has received scant attention, but long building leases have an in-
creasing vogue" and spendthrift trusts tend to the increase of long trust terms.
In the United States, too, the tendency to allow to be done by deed, what
can be done by will 7 must be reckoned with in the future. Nevertheless it is
by will, rather than by deed, that most settlements in the United States are
made. It would, therefore, seem that the part played in the past by the will
and the trust in the limitation of future interests in chattels is not likely to be
materially lessened. This predominant part played by the will and the trust
cannot be emphasized too much and should not be lost sight of when consider-
ing future interests in chattels in their less routine aspects.
BAILMENT AND THE LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP
The nearest thing to the landlord and tenant relationship in the law of
personal chattels was, and is, the bailment. The landlord finds his counterpart
in the bailor, the tenant his in the bailee. Both the bailment and the lease for
years concern specific property. Both commonly involve the turning over of
this specific property for the time being to another. In both there is a separa-
tion of possession from proprietary right. The interest of the bailor is often
spoken of as a reversionary interest. And yet the two relationships are not
identical. The bailor is not a land lord. Coke stated that there was no privity
of estate between the bailor and bailee, so that the same covenant made as to
land and cattle would run with the land but not with the cattle. 8 On the other
hand, because, it would seem, trespass vi et armis was denied to the landlord
subject to a term for years,'" it was denied also to the bailor of the furnishings
14. Lionel D. Edie, Investment, 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1932)
263, 265, estimated the value of outstanding securities in the United States in recent years
as from one third to one half of the national wealth. In England it was estimated at 60
per cent of the national wealth for 1918.
15. 7 HOLDSWORTH (1926), op. cit. supra note 7, at 477-8.
16. See White, Practical Considerations in the Drawing of 99 Year Leases (1920)
18 OHIO L. REP. 311.
17. See infra In the United States.
18. Spencer's Case, 5 Co. 16 a (1583).
19. Bedingfield v. Onslow, 3 Lev. 209 (1685).
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in a rented house,2 0 though previously there seems to have been no such re-
striction on the right of the bailor to bring either trespass or trover.21 Both
relationships had their origin in contract. 2 But while the bailment remains
predominantly contractual,2 in the case of the lease, the emphasis has shifted,
too far perhaps,2 4 from contract to property. There has been no such shift
in the case of the bailment.
The tenant for years seems to have been a misfit in the predominantly
feudal society in which he emerged. He had not the settled aspect of the tenant
in fee or even of the tenant for life. He was likely to be a husbandman, or a
money lender2l or an investor. 27 Whether for these or more strictly juristic
reasons,' he was denied the character of a freeholder and the term for years
denied the character of a freehold.29 Not only was the term for years not a
franc-tenement or freehold, in the beginning, it was treated as a mere contract
and not as an interest in the land at all."0 This was reflected in the doctrine
of the later law that the term for years was not a 'tenement' of any kind.3'
That it was not a 'tenement' was considered to follow inevitably from the
20. Ward v. Macauley, 4 T. R. 489 (1791).
21. See the opinion of Baron Parke as to trover in Manders v. Williams, 4 Exch.
339 (1840) and the admission by Holmes (COMMON LAW (1881) 172-3) although contrary
to the general trend of his argument. See, further, Bordwell, Property in Chattels (1916)
29 HARv. L. REv. 517-9.
22. As to the term for years, see 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
(2nd ed. 1899) 36, 106-7, 217. Bailment was a "real" not a consensual contract, -AMEs,
LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY (1913) 76-7. To bail was to deliver the possession of a chattel
and not necessarily with the obligation of redelivery to the bailor or his nominee. Bailler
might be used to indicate the consummation of a sale or a loan of money. See 2 POLLOCK
AND MAITLAND, id. at 169, 185. In this wide sense the bailment of a chattel corresponded
very closely with the feoffment of land and had more of conveyance and property in it than
in the beginning had the lease for years. In both the bailment and the feoffment it was the
possession that was transferred and there was no inherent reason why some interest could
not be retained in the case of the bailment as well as in the case of the feoffment. Pollock
and Maitland are convincing that this was the case and that the accepted conception be-
hind those kinds of bailment which would still be called such, was one of retention of owner-
ship or property by the bailor. Id. at 176-7. If the bailor lacked protection against third
parties, the fault lay with the remedial law. Id. at 177-8.
23. See Cullen, The Definition of a Bailment (1926) 11 ST. Louis L. REV. 257; cf.
Laidlaw, Principles of Bailment (1931) 16 CORN. L. Q. 236.
24. As in the reluctance to apply the doctrine of dependant covenants to leases and
the insistence on the lease as the purchase of an interest in the premises rather than an
agreement for their use.
25. The evidence tends to show that the husbandry lease--the common type of lease
in the United States-was not as early as the beneficial lease purchased by a premium. 2
POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 22, at 111, 113.
26. Id. at 112.
27. Id. at 116-7.
28. Id. at 114-5.
29. Id. at 36-7.
30. Id. at 36, 106-7, 217.
31. See Challis, Are Leaseholds Tenements? (1890) 6 L. Q. REv. 69, REAL PROPERTY
(3rd ed. 1911) app. I; WILLAMS, REAL PROPERTY (23rd ed. 1920) 22.
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fact that it could not be entaileda" Already in Bracton's time, however, this
denial of any interest in the land to the termor had been outmoded,3 a special
writ had been devised for his protection," and he had been accepted into the
category of tenants, for he was doing fealtya His protection6 and his respon-
sibilities3" as a tenant were still further increased by legislation of Edward I.
As a tenant he had a status or estate, 8 and in the new category of estates,
which developed with the Statute of Quia Emptores, 9 the term for years
found a more ready place" than in the category of tenements, which came to
be identified with the freehold.41 Even here, however, the contract origin
of the term for years remained somewhat of a stumbling block and so able a
lawyer as Challis could say that "terms of years originally pushed themselves
into the rank of 'legal estates' only by virtue of the statute 21 Hen. 8, c. 15."42
He was here, however, parting company with Littleton and Coke" whose
treatment of the term for years was essentially that of Bracton.
The term for years, therefore, seems to have changed from a mere contract
to a property right by the time of Bracton and the relationship of lessor and
lessee for years to have developed into that of landlord and tenant.44 This
landlord and tenant relationship was the privity of estate which Coke at-
tributed to the lessor and lessee for years, to sustain the running of the cove-
nants with the term, but which he denied to the bailor and bailee.4
The improved status of the termor was marked by an increasing effective-
ness of his remedies against third parties. The writ given him in Bracton's
time was narrowly construed,4" but trespass vi et armis was probably early
accorded him and he soon had a special form of this action for cases of eject-
ment.47 Only damages were at first given in ejectment but by the time of
Henry VII specific recovery was definitely allowed. 48 The termor thus gained
32. Challis, ibid.
33. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 22, at 107-9, 113.
34 Id. at 107-8; BRACTON, DE LEGISUS ANGLIAE, fol. 220.
35. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 22, at 113; BRACTON, Op. Cit. supra
note 34, fol. 80; LITTLETON, TENURES, § 132; Co. LITT. *67b.
36. Against collusive proceedings, STATUTE or GLOUCESTER, 6 EDW. 1, C. 11 (1278).
37. He was made liable for waste, id. c. 5.
38. See 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 22, at 10-11.
39. 18 EDW I, cc. 1-3 (1290).
40. See Bordwell, The Common Law Scheme of Estates (1933) 18 IowA L. REv., 426 n.
13, 427, 429.
41. WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 31.
42. REAL PROPERTY (3 ed. 1911) 64.
43. He frankly admits as much; Challis, Are Leaseholds Tenements? (1890) 6 L. Q.
REv. 69.
44. Examples of sub-leases are given of as early dates as 1271 and 1286. 2 POLLOCK
AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra at note 22, at 112 n. 8.
45. Spencer's Case, 5 Co. 16 a (1583), cited note 18, supra.
46. Id. at 108.
47. Id. at 108-9.
48. MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION (1916) 350.
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a remedy more suited to the times than the old freeholders' remedies which
he had been denied, and it soon supplanted them as the current'method
of trying title to land whether leasehold or freehold. 49 With the great develop-
ment of long terms in the time of Henry VIII which has already been men-
tioned, the term for years came to have a prominence in the conveyancing
world that was very different from its humble beginning. The genesis of the
recent property reform in England was the proposal to make the only interest
in land the term for years. This was termed evolution and not revolution.
It was, however, too revolutionary for the more conservative lawyers.9 The
fee simple was allowed to retain its place as a legal estate but the general
character of the reform was not changed."0
Less spectacular has been the history of the bailment. In the earlier his-
tory of the law the bailee was apparently in a more favored position than the
termor for years. Even before the advent of trespass, he, apparently, had
remedies, such as the actio furti and the appeal of robbery, against third
parties.$' Dean Ames would logically have ascribed to him, as to the disseisor,-
the absolute 'property' in the goods, with a mere contract right in the bailor. 53
To have ascribed the absolute property in chattels to the bailee, however,
would have found no support in the authorities and would have been as contra
to the ideas of the times of which Pollock and Maitland wrote as of later times.
To the lawyers and laymen of that time the bailor had the property, the
bailee, the custody.-
A more substantial theory than that of property in the bailee is that the
English law started out with the denial of all remedy to the bailor against third
parties.5 A corollary to this theory was that of absolute liability of the bailee
49. Id. at 351-3.
50. See Bordwell, Property Reform in England (1925) 11 IowA L. REv. 1, 8-9.
51. For the early actions when goods had been stolen or taken by robbery and as to the
availability of these actions to the bailee, see 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note
22, at 157-170.
52. "The disseisor gained by his tort both the possession and the right of possession;
in a word, the absolute property in the chattel." AMEs, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY (1913)
179.
53. Dean Ames expressly applied the doctrine of the preceding note to any conversion
by the bailee (id. at 180). Nor did he confine it to cases of conversion. It was his explana-
tion (id. at 194-5) of why in the later law the absolute property was attributed to the bailee
for life. He did not, in so many words, apply it to the ordinary bailment where there had
been no conversion but such was the logic of his position for he would have allowed the bailor
only a personal action in detinue against the bailee (id. at 73-5) and in such action the bailor
was not entitled to the return of the chattel as the defendant had the alternative of returning
the chattel or paying its value. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op cit. supra note 22, at 174-5.
Ames' theory of the bailment in the later law was that of a divided ownership between the
bailor and bailee. LECTURES ON LEGAL HIsToRY (1913) 193-4.
54. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 22, at 176-7. See supra note 22.
55. The best rounded account of this theory is that by Pollock and Maitland. 2
POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 22, at 155-180. It was Mr. Justice Holmes,
however, that first gave it general currency. COMMON LAW (1881) 165-180. The hesitation
6
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to the bailor. It was Mr. Justice Holmes who gave this theory vogue and,
as is so often the case, the limitations he put on the theory were overlooked
by his successors. He admitted the grant of trespass to the bailor "at a pretty
early date"' 6 and "that this was spoken of bailments generally, and was not
limited to those which are terminable at the pleasure of the bailor. 57 Further
"it was to be expected that some action should be given the bailor as soon as
the law had got machinery which could be worked without help from the fresh
pursuit and armed bands of the possessor and his friends. To allow the bailor
to sue, and to give him trespass, were pretty nearly the same thing before the
action on the case was heard of."' 5 Mr. Justice Holmes was evidently of the
opinion that the gift of trespass to the bailor was practically as old as the action
itself and that this was not confined to the bailment at will. Such is believed
to have been the case. The judges of the Year Books seem to have had no
difficulty in giving trespass to the bailor." For a time trespass threatened to
occupy a field comparable to the modern trover. The difficulty lay not in
giving the bailor the action but in finding a taking vi et armis in a delivery
by the bailee to a stranger or in some other act of the bailee after a delivery
to him. Conversion was a much more elastic term than trespass vi et armis
and became the fashion instead.
The practice of giving two actions for one wrong, e. g., trespass to the
bailor and to the bailee, was not, if we can believe the statement of counsel
in 1344-5, confined to trespass but was true also of the Appeals, because, he
says,-"both servant and master will have an appeal in respect of the same
felony." 6° The practice of the double appeal, of master and servant, is as old,
with which Pollock and Maitland accede to this theory in their direct account of it is some-
what lost in the sweeping generalization at the end of the chapter as to the inability of the
law of the time to sanction more than one interest in a chattel. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND,
op. cit. supra note 22, at 170, 172-3, 182-3. However sound this generalization may be as to
early feudal or pre-common law days, it does not seem true of the historic common law.
56. COMMON LAW (1881) 171.
57. Id. at 172; Ward v. Macauley, 4 T. R. 489 (1791), cited note 20, supra, contra,
fitted into the law of actions of its time and gained such general currency that even such
scholars as Ames and Maitland, with this statement of Holmes to warn them, failed to
recognize its novelty. This unawareness was a contributing factor to what is believed to be
the false impression that the historic common law started out without protection to the
bailor against third parties. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 22, at 173 n 1.
Trespass for the bailor seems not to have been the exceptional but the regular thing until
trespass on the case finally made it exceptional.
58. COMMON LAW (1881) 172. Fresh pursuit had been a marked feature of the early
Germanic action for cattle stealing and of the like actions for robbery and theft in the
English local courts and was carried over to a certain extent into the Appeals of Robbery
and Larceny in the royal courts. These were more highly punitive proceedings than the
earlier actions but retained their recuperatory character. Fresh pursuit seems to have re-
mained a requirement for the restitution of the stolen property after it had given way to
fresh prosecution as a condition of bringing the Appeals. AMEs, op. cit.supra note 52, at 52;
1 BaRITTON (ed. Nichol 1865) 118.
59. See Bordwell, Property in Chattels (1916) 29 HARv. L. REv. 501, 519.
60. Y. B. 18-19 Edw. III 508; Fitzh. Abr. 32.
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at least, as 1194.61 Servant and bailee were by no means clearly differentiated
at that time,.2 in fact, are not today except for purposes of criminal liability.63
The servant away from the house or the presence of his master was treated
like a bailee.1 Bracton's statements which are cited to show that the bailee
had the Appeals, refer primarily to cases of servants or villeins.15 Nothing
is said by him of two Appeals for one felony but that the possibility of the
Appeal in the servant or villein should have meant the denial of it to the
master or lord seems just as unlikely as it did to the lawyers of the following
century. The emphasis of Bracton and the other writers of his time67 is on
two interests to support an Appeal and the logic of that, in the case of the
bailment, was two Appeals for one felony.
Back of trespass and the Appeals, in the law of the old local courts, the
negative side of the old Germanic scheme, which would have denied all relief
against third parties to the bailor, may have found some place, but any direct
evidence to that effect is surprisingly lacking. Arguing from the later law, one
might suppose that the law in England as to the bailor had taken a different
turn from that on the Continent from the first. Whether this be so or not, the
historic common law, the law of the King's court, did take a very different
turn at a very early date. It would seem error, therefore, to make the denial
to the bailor of any remedy against the third hand "the starting point of our
common law." ' Rather, it would seem, the historic common law gave him
protection from the first and took very easily to the notion of two protected
interests in one chattel. If this be so, the gap between land and chattels was
even less than has been urged. 69
If the foregoing be sound, the failure to apply the law of tenure and estates
and remainders to chattels personal was not the consequence of any difficulty
61. 1 Rot. Cur. Reg. 51; AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY (1913) 59 n. 2. Ames'
statement, "nor could a servant maintain an appeal without his master" (id. at 59) is hardly
borne out by his citations. There was an early tendency to require something more than mere
custodia to support an Appeal lest the master hide behind the servant, but the thing empha-
sized as necessary was the servant's responsibility to his master and not the latter's presence.
See 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 22, at 172 n. 2.
62. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 22, at 172 n. 2.
63. HOLMES, COMMON LAW (1881) 227.
64. Id. at 226.
65. FOLIOS 103 b, 146 a.
66. Ibid. and fol. 151.
67. 1 BITrON (ed. Nichol 1865) 56; FLETA, LIB. I, c. 39; 2 MIRROR or JUSTICES,
(Sel. Soc.), c. 16, p. 57.
68. As urged by Pollock and Maitland. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra
note 22, at 172.
69. Maitland, The Seisin of Chattels (1885) 1 L. Q. REv. 324, and Ames, Disseisin of
Chattels (1889) 3 HARv. L. REv. 23, showed that the gap between the early land law and
the law of chattels was not as great as had been supposed. Pollock and Maitland would
seem to have left this gap wider than was warranted in doubting that the law of Bracton's
time could sanction two rights in one chattel. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra
note 22, at 181-3.
8
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in allowing two interests in a chattel. The surprising thing would have been
if it had been so applied. Despite the analogy between the feoffment and the
bailment 7 their fields were far apart. The background of the common law
scheme of estates and the subsequent steps in its development were lacking
in the case of the bailment. That background was the feudal land law. Status
was feudal and by a peculiar twist status became estate.71 The seignory with
its landlord and tenant relationship was feudal. Under the Statute of Quia
Emptores it was only one step from the seignory to the modern reversion
with its landlord and tenant relationship. 72 A second step, and a momentous
one, was from the reversion to the remainder.73 Had the feudal system
applied to chattels personal the first step and then possibly the second might
have been expected but certainly not the second without the first. As it was,
neither step was taken. In the case of the chattel real the first step was taken74
but not the seond.7 5
Unlike the feoffment and the bailment, the lease for years was dependent
not on delivery but on entry. This entry might, and commonly would be, in
futuro. The leasehold infuturo came naturally, therefore, though the freehold
in futuro was proscribed. A rival to the remainder, the interesse termini,
developed 76 and it was able to hold its own against the remainder in England
until abolished by the Law of Property Act, 1925. 7 7 Neither delivery nor
entry were necessary in the case of the will and so the limitation of chattels
by will developed quite independently of the bailment and the lease, in dif-
ferent courts and under the.influence of a foreign system of law. 7 8
USE AND OCCUPATION
The idea of a use and occupation in one person with the property in
another appears in the leading case involving future interests in chattels79
and apparently was at first applied to both chattels personal and chattels
real. 80 With the great development of future interests in chattels real, it was
70. Supra note 22.
71. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, Op. cit. supra note 22, at 10-1, 78-9.
72. Bordwell, The Common Law Scheme of Estates (1933) 18 IowA L. REv. 425, 430-1.
73. Id. at 432-3.
74. See supra note 44.
75. See infra The Interesse Termini.
76. Ibid.
77. 15 GEo. V, c. 20, § 149 (1) (2).
78. See infra Use and Occupation and The Executory Devise.
79. Y. B. 37 Hen. VI 30 (1459).
80. Where a chattel real was not devised outright, the common practice seems to have
been to devise the use and occupation to the one intended to have the limited interest rather
than to devise the term or the land for the limited period, or to devise an estate. When the
theory as to terms for years shifted from use and occupation to executory devise, there was
no longer occasion for this practice, but the continued emphasis in the later cases that the
use and occupation of the land or term was the same thing as the land or term itself, shows
the prevalence of the early practice. The term occupation in the phrase "use and occupation"
9
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discarded as to them8' but retained as to chattels personals ' and then grad-
ually faded out of the picture in England as to the latter,83 to be revived by
John Chipman Gray in consequence of a colloquy between himself and a
student.
8 4
Use and occupation has always been confined to testamentary gifts and
therein lies the clue to its origin. Testamentary gifts were within the juris-
diction of the Ecclesiastical courts85 and later of Chancery 8 and the greater
part of the law relating to them was developed under the influence of the
canon or civil law.87 That use and occupation had its genesis in the closely
related usus and habitatio of the civil law is convincing. 88 Chancery judges
of the late Stuarts turned to the civilians to find the true doctrine."9 The
civilian rule that there could not be a usufruct in perishables9" is reflected in the
like English rule as to life estates in consumables.1 In the later civil law, usus
and habitatio were classed as personal servitudes.12 These were "much more
like limited ownerships than like servitudes, but since a terminable ownership
was not recognized, the fact that they were of limited duration caused them
to be considered as rights different from, and less than, ownership-jura, in
re aliena."' 3 Exactly the same distinction was made between the use and
occupation of the English law and the property in the goods. The law of life
estates was a law of limited ownership. Not so with use and occupation. It
was something different and apart from the property or ownership.94 Again,
in the classical Roman law "ownership could not be conferred on the terms
that it was to end at a certain time or on the occurrence of a certain event:
there was no such thing as a terminable ownership, expressly created."' '
Compare this with Brooke's famous comment that "a gift or devise of a chattel
for an hour is for ever", but "where a man devises that W. 0. shall have
would seem to have special reference to the chattel real and to correspond to the habitatio
of the Roman law.
81. Infra p. 141.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (3rd ed. 1915) app. F.
85. 1 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (ed. 1922) 625-629.
86. Id. at 629-30.
87. 3 HOLDSWORTH, id. (ed. 1923), at 536.
88. For an account of these and other personal servitudes in the Roman law see
BUCKLAND, A TExT-BooK OF ROMAN LAW (1921) 267-274. These applied to moveables as
well as land. " Habitatio was a modification of usus of a house or lodging." (Id. at 274).
Usus was commonly created by will (id. at 273 n. 4) though not necessarily so (ibid.; D. 7.
8. 1.), while habitatio was apparently necessarily so created (id. at 274).
89. Vachel v. Vachel, 1 Cas. Ch. 129 (1669); Hyde v. Parrat, 1 P. Wms. 1 (1695).
90. BUCKLAND, op. cit. supra note 88, at 270.
91. Randall v. Russell, 3 Mer. 190 (1817).
92. BUCKLAND, op. cit. supra note 88, at 267-8.
93. BUCKLAND, A MANUAL OF PRIVATE ROMAN LAW (1925) 162.
94. Y. B. 37 Hen. VI 30 (1459).
95. BUCKLAND, 0p. cit. supra note 93, at 113.
10
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the occupation of his plate for term of his life, and if he dies, that it shall re-
main to I. S. this is a good remainder: for the first hath but the occupation,
and the other after him shall have the property. '9 6
Brooke's epigram, making ownership for a day ownership forever, was not,
like use and occupation, confined to the case of the devise but was expressly
extended to the case of the gift and in another version9" confined to the case
of the gift. This has obscured its very evident derivation from the Roman
law through the jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical courts over legacies and has
given an impression of the inability of the early common law to sanction two
rights in a chattel that is unwarranted. The statement did little to hinder the
development of future interests in chattels by will for there the notion of use
and occupation that went with it was a positive help. There was no such
"diversitie" in the case of gifts inter vivos, however, and so Brooke's striking
phrase pretty well killed any chance there might otherwise have been for the
gradual application to gifts of chattels inter vivos of the common law scheme
of estates.
The leading case on use and occupation,--the leading case on future in-
terests in chattels as well-was a case in 1459,98 in which the use and occupa-
tion of a grail or service book had been given to one executor for life, then to a
second executor for life and after his death to the parish. The first executor
had evidently turned it over to the parish, whether to be redelivered on re-
quest or by way of gift was in question, and after his death it was taken from
the parish by the second executor. He was sued in trespass by the wardens
of the parish. The. report of the case is inconclusive because of adjournment
but the discussion closed with the opinion of Moile, J. that the replication,
alleging a gift to the parish by the executor who was the first life tenant, was
good. There would, therefore, seem to be much in the suggestion of Dyer,
C. J.99 that the case really turned on the overriding effect of a transfer by an
executor' rather than on the overriding effect of a transfer by one having
the use and occupation. The inconclusive character of the report, however,
left this in doubt and up to the time of Welcden v. Elkington in 157711 the
common law courts, while ready to accept the theory of a use and occupation
for life in the first taker with a subsequent interest in some one else, were
apparently agreed that the second devisee was at the mercy of a transfer or
even a forfeiture by the one having the use and occupation for life.112 In reply,
96. BROOKE, ABR. Devise 13, March Transl. 61.
97. BROOKE, AnR., Done 57.
98. Y. B. 37 Hen. VI 30.
99. Welcden v. Elkington, Dyer 358 b, 359 a (1577).
100. See GODOLPHIN, THE ORPHANS LEGACY (1685) Pt. 2, c. 16, § 2; 1 WILLIAMS ON
EXECUTORS (12 ed. 1930) 547.
101. 2 P1. Com. 516 (1579); Dyer 358 b, 359 a.
102. The law at the beginning of Elizabeth's reign is well summed up by Brooke:
"If lessee for years devise his term, or other his chattel or goods, by testament, to one for
11
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evidently, to inquiries from Chancery, they said that the second devisee in
such a case had no remedy." 3 As there was no remedy at law, Chancery evi-
dently responded by requiring security of the first taker.
1 °4
The inadequacy of the common law remedy of the subsequent devisee of a
chattel prior to Welcden v. Elkington may have been due, as already indicated,
to a confusion between the powers of an occupant and of an executor, for in
other cases than that of the grail, the occupant was an, or the, executor, but the
difficulty went deeper than this. As far as the common law courts were con-
cerned the property was in the executor until he relinquished it and the various
devisees had a claim on him but no interest that the law could recognize
until he had assented to the particular devise. The assent to one devise was not
an assent to another. 0 5 The executor was notfunctus qfficio until he had finally
transferred the property. As applied to chattels personal this was rather a
desirable doctrine. It left a fiduciary to look after the property.'16 In the case
of the chattels real, however, there was no such continued need of responsi-
bility in the executor, for the land could not be destroyed or lost, and the
analogy to interests in the freehold would have made the first taker the
representative of the subsequent interests. As such representative, the assent
to his devise would be an assent to all the subsequent devises, with the executor
out of it. Under the theory of use and occupation the devise of the chattel had
been a direction to the executor, just as the limitation of the use before the
Statute of Uses had been a direction to the feoffee to uses. But if the assent
to the first devise of the chattel real was an assent to the subsequent devises
as well, then the subsequent devises ceased to be directions to the executor
and were a limitation of the chattel itself. The first assent gave subsequent
devisees legal rights which were executed automatically and which might
survive the death of the devisee during the continuance of the previous devise.
term of his life, the remainder over to another, and dies, and the devisee enters, and aliens
not the term, nor gives, or sels the chattel, and dies, there he in remainder shall have it;
but if the first devisee had aliened, given, or sold it, there he in the remainder had been
without remedie for it (B. Chattels 23 Done 57). And so B seems if they be forfeit in his life,
he in remainder hath no remedy. 33 H. 8 B. Done 57 the end." (March Transl. 33).
103. In Dyer 74 b (1552) Montague, C. J., said that all the justices in the time of
Lord Rich, Chancellor, were of the opinion that in such a case there was no remedy. The case
referred to by Montague, C. J., is possibly 2 Edw. VI, referred to in BROOKE's ABER. Devise
13, for Brooke in his various abstracts speaks the same language.
104. Lord Nottingham, in the Duke of Norfolk's Case, 2 Swans 458, 464 (1681), says
that when the common law judges, in the time of Elizabeth, came to have more regard to the
remainder, Chancery, to fix them in this opinion required security, but the more likely proc-
ess would seem the reverse. The difficulty being a matter of remedy, it was a typical case
for the jurisdiction of Chancery. Not to be outdone by Chancery, it would seem, the com-
mon law courts gave the remedy they had previously denied.
105. This is clearly brought out in the leading case, Y. B. 37 Hen. VI 30 (1459).
106. See Fearne's argument, CONTINGENT REMAINDERS AND EXECUTORY DEvisEs
(6 ed. 1809) 412-414.
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This step was taken with regard to chattels real in Welcden v. Elkington.107
Henceforward the theory of use and occupation was out of it as far as the
devise of the chattel real was concerned. Some other theory however, was
needed to take its place. A possible substitute was the duplication in the
chattel real of the interests already familiar in the case of the freehold. Welcden
v. Elkington tended in that direction and in his less technical moments the
language of Brooke had been the language of freehold estates. 1 8 The stumbling
block in the way of this, apparently, was in the allowance of a remainder
in a term for years after a devise for life. Remainder in the old sense of some-
thing that remained out was compatible with such a limitation but remainder
in its more modern sense, and in the sense in which it appears in Coke," 9
of a residue or something left over after the subtraction of a minor interest,
was more difficult. It seemed hard to say that there was anything left over
after the devise of a life estate in a term for years. A new theory, or at any rate
a new name, was necessary to reconcile the common lawyers to the sub-
sequent limitation and this was found in Manning's Case in 1609.110 The sub-
sequent interest was called an executory devise. Before taking up the story
of the executory devise, however, something further must be said of Welcden v.
Elkington, of the continued application of the theory of use and occupation to
the chattel personal, and of the interesse termini.
One of the difficulties in Welcden v. Elkington had been to reconcile the
subsequent gift to the son with the previous gift to the wife, which, according
to the old theory, was in effect a gift of the term itself. It was argued that the
subsequent gift to the son was void for repugnancy. m To avoid this repug-
nancy the judges said that they would treat the gifts as if they had been made
in the reverse order, when the repugnancy would disappear.' The will as a
whole was regarded rather than the precise order of the gifts. A like construc-
tion was resorted to in Manning's Case"' though from a somewhat different
angle.
The further point was made in Welcden v. Elkington that though the use
and occupation of the land was devised, this would be accounted a devise of
the land itself."4 This was even more ex'plicitly brought out in the argument
in Paramour v. Yardley"25 in the Queen's Bench a year later. There counsel
said: "In some things the occupation, profit, or use is a distinct thing from
the property. As one may have the occupation or use of a glass to look at
107. 2 Pl. Com. 516 (1579); Dyer 358 b, 359 a.
108. Supra note 102.
109. Co. LIT. 49 a.
110. 8 Co. 94 b.
111. This seems to have been Baldwin's point in Dyer 7 a (1536).
112. 2 Pl. Com. 522-3 (1579).
113. 8Co. 94b.
114. 2 Pl. Com. 524 (1579).
115. Ad. at 539.
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himself in, and another may have the property of it. So one may have the use
of a map or of a globe, and another the property. And so one may have the
use of a fire, and another the property. And so also of a book, one may have
the occupation or use of it to read in it, and the property may be in another.
So that in things of this kind the use, occupation, or function is distinct
from the property. But otherwise in the case of land, for there he who has the
occupation and use of it has the property of it for the time." '
The abandonment of the theory of use and occupation as to chattels real,
therefore, did not necessarily mean its abandonment as to chattels personal.
Commonly the use and occupation was for life or for a less period. 17 In 1565,
however, there is a note of a case"18 where a former Chief-Justice had devised
divers jewels and pieces of plate to one Nicholas and the heirs male of his
body and the court were of the opinion that "the said Nicholas had no property
in the said plate, but onely the use and occupation." No adverse comment
is made on this attempt to create an entail in a chattel personal by way of use
and occupation. For some time to come, however, the law courts were strict
in insisting that the words use and occupation or similar words should be used
and not the language of estates in devising the chattel personal. If the chattel
itself was devised for life the gift was absolute."' However, with the rejuvenes-
cence of Chancery after the Restoration of Charles II and its assumption of
the jurisdiction of the administration of decedents estates, Chancery insisted
that the exact words used were immaterial and that the devise of the chattel
for life should be construed as the devise of the use and occupation.i20 After
these cases in the times of the late Stuarts, there is a great dearth of judicial
authority as to the devise of future interests in chattels personal until recent
times. In 1788 it was held that the one having the beneficial interest and
possession for life could not confer a greater interest than she had on a pur-
chaser 2' and in 1817 that the old rule that a gift for life of a personal chattel
was an absolute gift of the chattel would still be followed where there was a
specific gift of chattels which are consumed by their very use. 2 The recent
tendency in England to abandon the theory of use and occupation even as to
chattels personal and to carry over to them the theory of the executory devise
or bequest, applicable to chattels real, will be considered later. 3
116. Id. at 542-3.
117. The usufructus of the Roman law "was usually for life, never more, and, some-
times for a fixed term." BUCKLAND, A TExT-BooK or ROMAN LAW (1921) 268. See also as to
habitatio, id. at 274.
118. Owen 33.
119. Anon., March 106 (1641).
120. Vachel v. Vachel, 1 Cas. Ch. 129 (1669); Hyde v. Parratt, 1 P. Wmo. 1 (1695).
121. Hoare v. Parker, 2 T. R. 376.
122. Randall v. Russell, 3 Mer. 190.
123. See infra, The Executory Devise.
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THE INTERESSE TERMINi
What the theory of use and occupation and the theory of executory devise
were to the limitation of the term for years by will, the theory of the inter-
esse termini was to its limitation at law by act inter vivos. These theories are
the key to the case law but have proved of variant vitality.
Executory devise, interesse termini, remainder, were logical consequences
of the three variant transactions under which they originated, the will, the
lease for years, and the feoffment. They are another example of the powerful
influence in any, and especially in a primitive, system of law, of the method of
transfer on the general property law. The will at common law was an informal
act and stressed the intent. The lease for years was not so formal as the feoff-
ment, for no delivery was required, but it was more formal than the will in
that entry was required and that more stress was laid on the exact words used
and less on the intent.
The operative fact of the feoffment was the delivery of the land. The
agreement, or the charter of feoffment, that accompanied it, was of second-
ary importance. Agreement could look to the future but transmutation of
possession, which was the phrase used to characterize the common law con-
veyances, was a present physical fact which occurred once and for all. An
agreement could "expect" but not the feoffment, as long as the judges insisted
on the importance of the delivery and refused to give delivery a fictitious
meaning. This the medieval judges did.u4 How to reconcile this formal
method of transfer with family settlements must have been a problem. It
was solved by the invention of the remainder, analogous to the reversion,
which was treated as a present interest of future enjoyment arising simul-
taneously with the particular estate or estates that preceded it.M The con-
tingent remainder did not fit into this scheme very well but in time it too was
allowed.L But the general principle of the feoffment, that it could not "ex-
pect," remained the same and except with the aid of the Statutes of Uses and
Wills, the freehold in futuro and the conditional limitation were ruled out.
The contract origin of the lease for years had its disadvantages but it had
this advantage, that the agreement of the parties had greater weight in the
transaction than the agreement did in the case of the feoffment. And once the
agreement was recognized as the vital thing, the way was open for future
transfers and future interests, for one could agree as readily to a future trans-
fer or interest as to a present. The consequence of this was that the lease for
years, unlike the feoffment, could "expect. 1' 2 7 Resort was not necessary,
124. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 22, at 88-92.
125. Bordwell, The Common Law Scheme of Estates (1933) 18 IowA L. REv. 425,
432-4.
126. Bordwell, supra note 125, at 434-5.
127. Palmer v. Thorpe, Cro. Eliz. 152 (1589).
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therefore, to the rather artificial conception of the common law remainder.
The leasehold infuturo even after the lessor's death, was recognized at an early
date' 8 and apparently never questioned. Successive leases could be granted
and the first lease made terminable on a contingency and a new lease limited
to take effect on the happening of this contingency. Such contingency might
have been the death of the previous tenant."9 Where the lessor was the holder
of the fee, the above cases presented little difficulty. In such case, at any rate,
the uncertainty as to the date of beginning or that the contingency was as to
event and not merely as to time and might not happen at all, were early swept
aside as immaterial. The certainty which characterized the term for years as
distinguished from the tenancy for life or the tenancy at will, did not here
prove much, if any, of a restriction."'
Where there was only a term for years to dispose of, the matter was more
difficult.' The difficulty, however, was rather as to form than to sub-
stance. In an early case, already referred to,"2 it was said that a grant by a
termor of so many of the years as should remain at his death would be void for
the uncertainty. Brooke queried as to this, and in the time of Elizabeth it
was settled that if the grant at the termor's death took the form of a demise
for a definite term of years, the limitation was good."' In Locroft's Case the
subsequent grant is reported in Croke and Coke as for a longer term than the
original lease"3 so as to amount, in the modern law at least, to an assignment
of the original lease. Apparently if the future sub-lease or assignment took
the form of a term for a definite number of years, though its beginning should
be an uncertain event such as the death of the termor or of a preceding tenant,
the requirement of certainty was satisfied. Locroft's Case was that of a term
commencing with the death of the termor but if the proper form of a term for a
definite number of years were observed, there is no reason to believe that the
result would have been different had it followed another term for years de-
feasible on the previous tenant's death."5 The objection of uncertainty
128. Bao. ABR. Graunts, 154, 7 E. 6 (1552), id., Lease, at 66; March Transl. 111.
129. The Rector of Chedington's Case, 1 Co. 153 a (1598); a clearer account of the
case under the name of Lloyd v. Wilkinson, is given in Moore 478.
130. See The Bishop of Bath's Case, 6 Co. 34 b (1605).
131. The difference between the two situations is brought out in the citations from
Brooke, supra note 128.
132. Supra note 128.
133. Grute v. Locroft, Cro. Eliz. 287 (1591), Moore 395, pl. 514, referred to in The
Rector of Chedington's Case, 1 Co. 153 a, 155 a (1598), in Blamford v. Blamford, 3 Bulst.
98, 108 (1615), by Coke C. J., in Foot v. Berkley, Carter 147, 155 (1666), by Tirrel, J. See
also Anon., Poph. 4 (1592); Herbin v. Chard, Poph. 97 (1595); Gree v. Studley, 2 Salk.
413 pl. 3 (1699), 1 Ld. Raym. 737 by Holt C. J.; 10 Vin. Abr., Estate, B. b. 5.
134. Cro. Eliz. 287, 1 Co. 155 a; but in Moore 395, the original lease is given as the
longer.
135. Gray does not notice the distinction between the grant of the residue of the
years after the termor's death and the grant of a definite term commencing with such death.
However, Popham. C. J. (1 Co. 155 a) and Walmesly, J. (Poph. 97), whom Gray quotes
16
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could not henceforth be made merely because the future interest was to begin
at the termor's or other tenant's death, and the Bishop of Bath's Case"' would
have seemed to remove the objection based on the uncertainty of the contin-
uance of such future interests even though it were for the "residue of the years"
after the death, for that case held that certainty as to continuance might be
had either "by express numbering of years" or "by matter ex post facto.'31 7
In later years it seems to have been taken for granted that there was no fatal
uncertainty in such a phrase."" In fact the real objection as to uncertainty
had been as to the beginning of the future term and not as to its continuance" 9
and once the former was removed, the objection as to uncertainty lost all
vitality.
At the time, therefore, that Manning's Case4 ' was decided and executory
devises were allowed in terms for years, the time was ripe for allowing the
same thing to be done with the term by sub-lease and assignment under the
theory of the interesse termini that could be done by will under the theory of
executory devise. The difficulty in allowing life estates and remainders in
terms for years seemed equally great whether by will or by act inter vivos.
There was the same theory of the indivisibility of the chattel interest, the
increasingly technical meaning of "remainder," the same unwillingness to
duplicate within the term, the freehold estates. On the other hand, the possible
escape from these difficulties was as available in the one case as in the other.
The lease, like the will, could "expect" and on the basis of transfers infuturo
there was the possibility of making the term for years more adaptable and
modern than if it were made to conform to the common law scheme. In the
one case, that of the will, this means of escape was taken advantage of,'4 '
in the other, that of the sub-lease and assignment, the opportunity was missed,
though they remained a potential means of settling a term for years without
the use of a trust term,"4 2 and remain so today.
The vitality of the executory devise, the sterility of the interesse termini,
has doubtless had many a parallel in the biological world. Perhaps explana-
tion enough would be that it just happened so. Some explanation, however,
may be found in the differences between the demise and the devise. The de-
in his THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (3rd ed. 1915) §§ 808, 809, to show that the termor
could grant nothing to commence after a previous tenant's death, agreed to this 'diversitie'.
136. 6 Co. 34 b (1605).
137. Co. 35 a.
138. The whole argument in Wright v. Cartwright, Burr. 282 (1757), was that such
words would render the lease good.
139. See especially the position taken by Walmsley and Wyndham, J. J., in Green
v. Edwards, Cro. Eliz. 216 (1590), 1 Leon. 218, 1 And. 258, Moore 297.
140. 8 Co. 94 b. (1609).
141. See infra, The Executory Devise.
142. See PRESTON, ABSTRACTS OF TITLE (ed. 1819) 153; LEwis, THE LAw OF PER-
PETUITY (ed. 1843) 90-1; contra, semble, GRAY, op. cit. supra note 84, § 811.
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mise was the more formal in that entry was necessary to complete the trans-
action. The demise was commonly by deed and the construction of deeds was
more technical than of wills in which greater stress was laid on the intent.
Finally the executory devise was developed under severe competition with
Chancery while at only one stage of the law does the competition between the
interesse termini and the trust deed appear, and this was at a time when
Chancery was in the ascendancy.
The theory of the interesse termini is older than that of the executory de-
vise and goes back in fact, if not in name, at least as far as Littleton.' Before
entry, a lessee for years was not capable of receiving a release, for he had
"only a right to have the same land by force of the lease."' Such right was
substantial enough to survive the death of the lessor 45 or lessee'46 prior to any
entry and according to Coke was grantable to another even in case of a future
or reversionary term. 4 7 Under the Statute of Uses, 48 the importance of the
entry to support a release was largely destroyed' and the interesse termini,
in consequence, was much less conspicuous. In the field of future interests,
however, its potentialities remained as great as ever.
The lease, unlike the will, was peculiarly the creature of the common law
courts. In the case of the will, where the testator was frequently without aid of
counsel, the misuse of some technical word was not so fatal, but no such
leniency was felt as to transactions inter vivos. If in the attempt to settle a
term by deed, the language of the freehold was used, it was just too bad for the
settlor. And if the "residue of the term" was used instead of the "residue of
the years" the mistake was fatal until Lord Mansfield introduced a more
liberal practice. 5 '
The executory devise had developed under the competition of Chancery. 5'
For some reason no such competition developed between the interesse termini
and the trust deed. But on one notable occasion they clashed. Sir Orlando
Bridgeman, known as the father of modern conveyancing, had drawn up the
trust deed which was in question before Lord Nottingham in the Duke of
Norfolk's Case.'52 The heads of the common law courts were called in for ad-
vice and Pemberton, C. J., seems to have felt that Sir Orlando had rather
bungled the thing by not resorting to successive leases.'5' Lord Nottingham
143. TENURES, §§ 66, 459.
144. Id. § 459.
145. Id. § 66.
146. Co. LIT. 46 b.
147. Id. at 46 b, 54 b.
148. 27 HEN. VIII, c. 10 (1535-6).
149. WILLIAMS, REAL PROPERTY (23 ed. 1920) 214-6.
150. Wright v. Cartwright, 1 Burr. 282 (1757).
151. See supra, Use nd Occupation.
152. 3 Cas. Ch. 1, 27, 36 (1682).
153. Id. at 24.
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was very pointed in his rebuke' a and termed the suggestion "such a subtilty
as would pose the reason of all mankind."'n This could not have aided the
popularity of the interesse termini as a means of settling terms for years.
By the Law of Property Act, 1925,1 the doctrine of the interesse termini
was abrogated. With the repeal of the Statute of Uses this was necessary
lest the old requirement of entry be revived in all its former importance.
Irrespective of this, the abrogation was just as well, for the interesse termini
was a pronounced case of arrested development.
THE EXECUTORY DEVISE
The cases of Welcden v. Elkington and Paramour v. Yardley 57 had denied
the consequences of the theory of use and occupation to the chattel real and
thus differentiated it from the chattel personal, but they had not squarely
met the old objections to the application of the law of freehold estates to the
term for years. Hard-headed common law judges like Walmsley felt this to be
a great difficulty.15 s A new category, or at least a new name, was needed to
reconcile the result in these cases with the older theory, and it was found in
Manning's Case in 1609.159 A term for years had been devised for life with a
limitation over. The subsequent devise was assumed not to be a proper re-
mainder but was held to be good as an executory devise. In some respects
this looks like a mere juggling with words and so it was deemed by Lord
Nottingham"6 and by Lord Mansfield. 6' What made it look more like a
juggling with words was that the judges construed the words in reverse order
as in Welcden v. Elkington.162 This was not, however, as in W~elcden v. Elkington,
to avoid a repugnancy by construing the will as a whole, but apparently to
show that the subsequent limitation needed no particular estate to support
it and therefore was not properly in the category of a remainder. 6 ' Read in
reverse order, the character of the second limitation as a gift infuturo rather
than a remainder was much clearer. Once the point was made clear, however,
the reverse construction could be dropped for it was expositional rather than
anything fundamental. Certainly in the light of subsequent history, Man-
ning's Case was something more than the clever evasion of embarrassing prece-
dents. A new name was invented for interests that had formerly been nameless.
154. Id. at 36.
155. Id. at 50.
156. 15 GEo. V, c. 20, § 149 (1) (2).
157. See supra, Use and Occupation.
158. Woodcock v. Woodcock, Cro. Eliz. 795 (1600) 6; Matthew Manning's Case,
8 Co. 94 b. 95 a (1609).
159. 8 Co. 94 b.
160. The Duke of Norfolk's Case, 2 Swans. 454, 464 (1682).
161. Wright v. Cartwright, 1 Burr. 282 (1757).
162. See supra, Use and Ocupation.
163. GRAY, op. cit. supra note 84, §§ 58-60, uses like reasoning in arguing that a con-
tingent use is good though preceded by an estate for years.
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Had the name been restricted to future devises of terms for years its impor-
tance might still have been greater than that of the interesse termini in trans-
actions inter vivos, but not immeasurably so. However, it was not so restricted,
and in Pells v. Brown'6 was used to sanction the devise of a fee on a fee, which
had been proscribed in Corbet's Case.'6' The hard-fought battle which the
common law judges thought they had won in Corbet's Case and in Chudleigh's
Case '6 against limitations contrary to the common law'67 was thus in a fair
way to be lost. The new name gave a tangibility to these new limitations by
way of devise which formerly they had lacked. They were still not regarded
with favor. The common law remainder was still preferred.6 6 But the execu-
tory devise had a definite, if inferior, place beside it in the future limitation
of the freehold. The old monopoly of the remainder was gone. Remainder
was still likely to be used loosely of any limitation that remained out after a
preceding limitation, but more and more this primary meaning of remainder
faded out, and the remainder came to be only a favored class of future limita-
tions of the freehold, to be carefully distinguished from executory interests.
Coke and his associates would doubtless have regretted their ingenuity
if they had thought that by the turn of a phrase they were undermining the
victories previously gained against limitations of the freehold, by means of the
use or devise, contrary to the course of the common law. The term for years
involved neither the Statute of Uses 9 nor Wills170 and it was with the term
for years that Manning's Case was directly concerned. Apparently they did
feel that there was little harm in allowing what was in effect a life interest in a
term as long as this could be reconciled with the old authorities. The diffi-
culty was technical rather than substantial. Once this technical difficulty
was overcome, they and their successors showed some, but not much,
hesitation in allowing to be created by will in terms for years, interests
analogous to the traditional common law interests. In time, one life interest
after another was recognized, 7i and interests analogous to the contingent
remainder. 72 Towards the end of the century the analogy of the possibility
of reverter was resorted to, to support what, in the case of the freehold, would
have been a reversion. 73 In the year following Manning's Case, even a devise
164. Cro. Jac. 590 (1620).
165. 1 Co. 83 b (1599-1600).
166. 1 Co. 134 b (1589-95).
167. Bordwell, The Conversion of the Use into a Legal Interest (1935) 21 IowA L. REv.
1, 19-20.
168. Id. at 24-5, 33.
169. 27 HEN. VIII, c. 10 (1535-6).
170. 32 HEN. VIII, c. 1 (1540).
171. Alford's Case, Bridg. J. 584 (1662).
172. Cotton v. Heath, I Roll. Abr. 612 pl. 3, Poll. 26 (1638).
173. Eyres v. Faulkland, I Salk. 231 (1697).
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over after the limitation of a term to one and the heirs of his body was said
to be within the protection of the common law courts. 74
Not long after Manning's Case, however, a reaction set in against allowing
the devise over for a term of years after a gift to one and the heirs of his body175
Many had been the devices attempted by conveyancers to get around the
dockability of the entail. For a time, in Scholastica's Case,76 they seemed to
have found such a device in the will. The ultimate reversal of Scholastica's
case was the aim of Bacon 7 7 in his argument in Chudleigh's Case, and this
was finally accomplished in Mary Portington's Case in 1613.71 If now the fee
tail should be allowed by devise in the term for years, the fight for the power to
disentail would be lost, for the disentailing machinery, the common recovery
and the fine, was not adaptable to the term for years. The judges soon saw,
therefore, that they had gone too far toward allowing entails in terms for
years and disallowed the subsequent limitations. In accordance with the old
law the devise of a fee tail in a term for years was the devise of the whole term.
And any of the gifts after failure of issue which would have turned the preced-
ing estate into a fee tail in the case of the freehold, shared the same fate as
gifts limited after express fee tails.17
The case that put an end to the threat of allowing by devise what would
practically have amounted to an entail of a term for years, was Child v. Bay-
lie.' In subsequent years, however, this aspect of the case was rather lost
sight of, and the case was criticized for having failed to distinguish between
the case of the entail, where the gift over would be after an indefinite failure
of issue, and the case where something more than a mere life interest was
given to the first taker, but where the gift over, if it took effect at all, would
take effect after a life in being, or, in other words, after a definite failure of
issue.' Child v. Baylie was a case of the latter kind. The first decision in
Child v. Baylie was in the King's Bench in 1618. Two years later the same
174. Tatton v. Mollineux, Moore 809 (1610), Pollexf. 24. Two years later, in Reth-
erick v. Chappel, 2 Bulst. 28, the devise of a term after successive devises in tail was held
good. Chancery had evidently long given protection to the devisee in such a case. See
Wallis v. Arden (1571) and Price v. Jones (1583-4) Tot. 122, both cited in Cole v. Moore,
Moore 806 (1607).
175. Bennet v. Lewknor, 1 Roll. Rep. 356 (1616).
176. Newis v. Lark, 2 Plow. 408 (1572).
177. 7 BAC. WORKS (Spedding's ed.) 636. See Bordwell, supra note 167, at 1, 30-31.
178. 10 Co. 35 b.
179. Child v. Baylie, Cro. Jac. 459 (1618-1623), Palm. 48, 333, W. Jo. 15, 2 Roll.
129, definitely overruled Retherick v. Chappel, 2 Bulst. 28, and approved Bennet v. Lewk-
nor, 1 Roll. 356 (1616). In Sanders v. Cornish, Cro. Car. 230 (1631), there was an attempt
to limit a term in strict settlement. The court was inclined to hold the devise bad. After
1660 the cases holding the devise over after an indefinite failure of issue became numerous.
For the cases see GRAY, op. cit. supra note 84, at 161.
180. Cro. Jac. 459 (1618-1623).
181. The Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Cas. Ch. 1, 2 Swans. 454 (1682).
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court, with a change of but one member in four,"12 decided Pells v. Brown.113
The same sort of limitation was involved, but it concerned the freehold and
not a term for years. The first resolution in the later case was that such a
gift over did not convert the preceding limitation into a fee tail. Henceforth,
Child v. Baylie did not involve a fee tail but a conditional limitation, and one
might have expected a reversal of the King's Bench. Three years after Pells v.
Brown, Child v. Baylie was carried to the Exchequer Chamber but there was
no reversal. The judges said they did not want to extend Manning's Case
nor did they show any inclination to extend Pells v. Brown. As subsequent
events showed, the common lawyers, under Manning's Case, were willing to
duplicate in the term for years by will, the things that could be done with
freehold life estates, but there they stopped. The heads of all three common
law courts were still of this mind in the Duke of Norfolk's Case,8l more than
three score years later.
The Duke of Norfolk's Case has been made so much of as the fountain head
of the modern rule against perpetuities, that it is likely to be overlooked that
the perpetuity was only one of the negative aspects of the case and that the
rule as to remoteness of vesting was merely one way of meeting objections to
the multiplication of interests which Chancery favored. Perhaps there is
nothing more anomalous in the law than duplicating with the term for years
the very elaborate things that can be done with the fee simple. As though
two kinds of ownership of land, legal and equitable, were not enough, the
possibility of long terms limitable for most purposes in the same way as the
fee simple, meant what was virtually a third kind in the already complicated
land law. The common lawyers were against such duplication in the first
place but finally under the pressure of Chancery allowed life interests and
their concomitants. There, under Child v. Baylie, they for a time drew the
line. But long terms were very much a fact in the life of the times and Lord
Nottingham felt, that but for the entail, a man should be able to do with these
long terms by executory devise or trust deed practically what he could with
the fee simple. The undue multiplication of these executory interests he felt
could be met by a rule against remoteness of vesting. The positive side of the
Duke of Norfolk's Case was that it established these executory interests both
as to the term for years and as to the freehold on a new basis."u Henceforth
executory interests had a definitely accepted place in the law, although in the
case of the freehold, the remainder still had the preference.
Whether executory devises, or bequests, as they are more modernly called,
of terms for years, are still possible at law in England is a question since the
182. Sir John Croke had died and his place taken by Sir Thomas Chamberlain.
183. Cro. Jac., 590 (1620).
184. 3 Cas. Ch. 1, 2 Swans. 454 (1682).
185. See Bordwell, The Conversion of the Use into a Legal Interest (1935) 21 IowA L.
Rav. 1, 20-1, 32-3.
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Law of Property Act, 1925.180 That Act turned executory devises of the free-
hold into equitable interests and made them subject to the Settled Land Act,
1925. If executory bequests of terms for years are not brought within the
Settled Land Act, 1925, then the Settled Land Act, 1925, can be evaded by
means of long terms just as the Statute of Uses was.18 7 History may repeat
itself in this respect but this does not seem at all likely. Fore-warned is fore-
armed and there seems to be no disposition to flout the Statute.
Though it would thus seem that the day for the legal executory bequest
of a term for years in England is over, there is some authority for holding that
the theory of the executory bequest has there supplanted the theory of use
and occupation as to chattels personal. 8 8 The authority is not that of an ap-
pellate court, but it is backed up by the opinions of most text-writers.8 9
Gray, at first, accepted this authority as sound but in his later editions re-
verted to the older theory of use and occupation, 9 ' which he considered more
satisfactory from the point of view of the rule against perpetuities. Sir William
Holdsworth seems inclined to Gray's view.' 9'
Legal future interests in chattels personal by act inter vivos in England
have yet to await development. By trust deed, however, everything can be
done with the personal chattel that can be done with it by will. This prefer-
ence for equity is not likely to be lessened by the fact that future interests in
land were thrown into equity by the Property Acts of 1925. Blackstone
92
said that a life estate could be created in a personal chattel by deed and did
not specify a deed of trust, but it seems as if it must have been the latter he
had in mind. His statement has had no effect on the English practice. As far
as gifts inter vivos are concerned the law would seem to be about where it was
in the time of Brooke. Sales, and especially conditional sales, it would seem,
may open the doors for future legal interests in personal chattels, for by
means of the sale, title may pass in futuro, and the conditional sale goes at
least as far as the old common law condition and reverter. But sale and
conditional sale have remained commercial instead of passing into the field of
settlement, as the bargain and sale did to some extent in the case of land.
IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United States there has been a tendency to get away from the
tortuous paths by which future interests in chattels gained such position
186. See Potter, The Modern Classification of Future Estates in Land in English Law
(1933) 18 IOWA L. REv. 289, 291-294.
187. Id. at 294.
188. In re Tritton, 61 L. T. R. 301 (1889) 6 Morr. 250; In re Thynne (1911) 1 Ch.
282; In re Blackhouse, (1921) 2 Ch. 51.
189. See 7 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW (1926) 476-7.
190. GRAY, op. cit. supra note 84, § 831.
191. Id. at 477.
192. 2 BL. COMM. (1st. Am. Ed. 1771) 398.
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as they did in England. The positions having been gained, the tendency has
been to make the paths straight and to consolidate and extend the positions.
There was an opportunity for this in a new country such as did not exist in the
old. Just as in England the common law of torts and contracts had developed
around certain forms of action, so the common law of property had developed
around certain forms of transfer, and there was hardly a law of property at all,
but a law of feoffments, and a law of wills, and a law of bargains and sale.
In the first half of the 1800's the tendency both in England and the United
States was to get away from the law of actions to a substantive law of torts
and contracts that should be more scientific than the old. In the United
States, the feoffment, the fine and the recovery, and all the intricacies of the
old English conveyancing, never had any real existence, and so in the field
of property the tendency was away from a law of transfers, to a more scientific
view of the general law of property. What could be done by will, it seemed
reasonable, should also be possible by act inter vivos, and if interests in chattels
and land were practically the same, there was no sense in calling them by
different names. If the old English statutes were operative, they were in force
not as such, but in principle, or as part of the common law. A narrow con-
struction of the Statute of Uses limiting its application to uses limited on the
freehold did not preclude the recognition in the United States of interests in
chattels which but for that narrow construction would long have had recog-
nition in England.
Long before the American Revolution, in fact from the Duke of Norfolk's
Case,9  it had been accepted law in England that practically everything
could be done with the term for years by will, that could be done with the
freehold, except create an entail. Furthermore, prior to the Duke of Norfolk's
Case, future interests in terms following gifts for life, had been treated by
analogy to the law of the freehold, although they had been called executory
devises.' M On analogy to the older common law of the freehold, a conditional
limitation after an interest greater than a life interest had been denied.Y5
The Duke of Norfolk's Case allowed such a conditional limitation and thus
made the analogy to the more modernized law of the freehold complete.'
As Lord Mansfield said,19 7 practically the only difference left, except in the
case of the entail, was in the name. What was called a remainder in the
case of the freehold, in the case of the term, was called an executory devise.
This law has not been questioned in the United States, 99 though there has
193. 3 Cas. Ch. 1, 2 Swans. 454 (1682).
194. Supra The Executory Devise.
195. Child v. Baylie, Cro. Fac. 459 (1618-1623), Palm. 48, 333, cited notes 179, 180,
supra.
196. Supra The Executory Devise.
197. Wright v. Cartwright, 1 Burr. 282 (1757).
198. GRAY, op. cit. supra note 84, §§ 71b, 816, 856.
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not been great room for its application. If the language of estate and remainder
is used where such language would be proper of the freehold, no harm is done,
and probably a more accurate idea is gained of the law applicable to such
situation than if such language had been avoided.
According to two such great conveyancers as Preston and Lewis, the
term for years could have been settled at law by deed through the theory of
the interesse termini as effectively as by will. 9 ' For some reason the potential-
ities of this theory were never realized. The recognition of such potentialities
in the United States, however, works in with the prevalent theory of allowing
to be done by deed what can be done by will and is supported by such cases as
Culbuth v. Smith."' Here, too, as in the case of the executory devise, it would
seem better to follow the analogies of the freehold as far as possible, treating
the future interests as executory interests only where the analogy to the law
of the freehold demands. If the language of the freehold is used instead of the
language of the interesse termini, this should be no more fatal than in the case
of the will. In the United States the grantor is about as likely to be without
adequate counsel as the testator. The same leniency should be allowed him
as in the case of the executory devise, for the technique of the interesse termini
is even less familiar. In fact the old technique of the interesse termini would
seem quite obsolete.
In the case of the chattel personal, the old theory of use and occupation
in gifts by will does not seem to have survived, in England, the period of the
American Revolution but seems to have given way to the theory of the execu-
tory devise or bequest. 21' The latter followed more closely the law of the free-
hold, for it made the first taker the representative of the succeeding interests
in the matter of the executor's assent.2 2 On the other hand use and occupation
partook more of the simplicity of the early common law of estates. If one be
used to supplement the other the parallel to the modern law of the freehold is
striking. To the extent that use and occupation is stressed, the tendency will
be to exalt the position of the executor as urged by Fearne 2 s and to secure the
subsequent holder. That the law parallels the law of the freehold does not
mean that it should be identical. The materials are handy in the case law of the
United States" to work out a satisfactory law of future interests in chattels
personal by will that shall harmonize with the law of the freehold and yet
take into consideration the physical differences between land and moveables.
199. 3 PRESTON, ABSTRACTS OF TITLE (ed.1819) 153; LEWIs, THE LAW OF PERPETUITY
(ed. 1843) 90-1.
200. 69 Md. 450 (1888).
201. Supra Use and Occupation and Executory Devise.
202. See supra Use and Occupation.
203. CONTINGENT REMAINDERS AND EXECUTORY DEVISES (6th ed. 1809) 412-414.
204. See GRAY, op. cit. supra note 84, §§ 844-852. For a more modernistic approach,
see Simes, Future Interests in Chattels Personal (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 771.
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The settlement of chattels personal by deed, other than deed of trust, or
other act inter vivos was, and still is, dormant in England."' In the United
States, however, two elements have entered in that have made a difference,
the statement by Blackstone that life estates and remainders could be created
in personal chattels by deed,2 and the existence of a peculiar kind of chattels,
slaves. The generations of American lawyers who were brought up on Black-
stone, if their attention was called to the statement by Brooke that a gift of a
chattel for a day was a gift of it forever, most probably regarded it as a bit of
antiquarian lore with which they had little concern. At any rate they followed
Black.tone as ample authority. And there was more occasion for this than in
England because of the tendency to make family gifts of slaves for life. These
might be by deed and then the authority of Blackstone was directly in point,
or they might be by less formal means, 2 7 but as long as the method of transfer
was a proper method for chattels, it was held sufficient. Even executory
limitations of chattels personal by acts inter vivos have been allowed.20s In
the case of sales this would seem to follow from the possibility of future trans-
fers. In the case of gifts the analogy from executory bequests is strong.
The clarification of the law by the selective application of the law of
estates and executory interests to chattels would seem a great desideratum.20 9
One of the great services of John Chipman Gray was that he found authority
for such clarification in the existing American authorities. This would not
mean that more or less discredited doctrines like the destructibility of con-
tingent remainders would have to be taken over and applied to chattels. The
law of chattels would by no means have to be identical with the law of land.
Tenure by no means would have to be carried over to chattels personal. But
the law of chattels would be assimilated to the law of land and the crooked
places would be made straight.
205. See supra The Executory Devise.
206. 2 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. supra note 192.
207. Brummet v. Barber, 2 Hill S. C. 543 (1834).
208. GRAY, op. cit. supra note 84, at 846-848.
209. Contra, Simes, Future Interests in Chattels Personal (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 771.
In the opinion of the present writer, the abandonment of the old categories and the adoption
of a new terminology, would tend to make the law of future interests even more a matter of
words than it was recently accused of being.
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